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Abstract
We study a seller who sets a reserve price in a second price auction with uncertainty over
the joint distribution of bidders’ valuations. The seller only knows the mean of the marginal
distribution of each bidder’s valuation and the range, and an adversarial nature chooses the
worst-case distribution within this ambiguity set. We use a dual characterization to solve for
this distribution. We nd that the seller’s optimal reserve price tends to be low and converges
to zero in probability as the number of bidders increases.
Keywords: Robust mechanism design, second-price auction, reserve price.
JEL codes: D82, D44
1 Introduction
In the standard auction theory, beginning with Myerson (1981), the seller’s uncertainty over the bid-
ders’ private values is typically modeled as a well-dened prior distribution. While this framework
is exible, and allows for a wide range of beliefs, it does not describe how such beliefs are formed
in the rst place. Indeed, the seller not only faces uncertainty over the realizations of a probability
distribution, but also the deeper uncertainty that they may not have the correct model at all.
How does a seller, who is concerned about model misspecication, form their beliefs? Stepping
back, perhaps it is unrealistic to assume that a seller begins with a full distribution over types, which
is high-dimensional and assigns a specic probability to all possible circumstances. It is more realistic
that the seller carries low-dimensional “summary statistics,” such as the mean, variance, mode, etc.,
on which he bases his decisions. In such a case, one reasonable criterion, if robustness is desired, for
choosing among the distributions that match these moments, is choosing the one which makes him
worst o.
In order to study this setting, we consider a second price auction in which the seller chooses
an optimal reserve price.1 The seller lacks knowledge of the distribution of value proles, and only
knows the mean of the marginal distribution for each bidder’s valuation and the range of possible
valuations. The seller’s belief over value proles is determined as the outcome of a zero-sum simul-
taneous move game, in which nature chooses bidders’ distribution to minimize the seller’s revenue
∗Chicago Booth School of Business.
1We focus on second price auctions instead of a broader class of mechanisms, since we are primarily interested in the
seller’s beliefs over unknown types, rather than the higher-order beliefs among bidders.
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and the seller chooses a reserve price to maximize his revenue. We nd that the seller’s equilibrium
strategy converges in probability to the strategy that is payo equivalent to the zero reserve price
as the number of bidders increases.
This paper joins the growing literature of robust mechanism design, beginning with Scarf (1957).
There is much work that addresses robust design in auctions, such as Bergemann et al. (2016), Berge-
mann et al. (2019), Brooks and Du (2019), and Du (2018).2 The papers closest to ours are: He and Li
(2019), Suzdaltsev (2018), Kocyigit et al. (2019), and Carrasco et al. (2018). He and Li (2019) consider a
similar second-price auction setting in which a seller is uncertain over the joint distribution of valu-
ations but knows the full marginal distributions. Kocyigit et al. (2019) study the Stackelberg version
of our robust second price auction problem, in which nature has a second-mover advantage and fully
knows the reserve price before choosing the worst-case distribution (subject to the same symmet-
ric mean and range constraints).3 Suzdaltsev (2018) considers the Stackelberg version of the second
price auction problem under mean and variance constraints, and under the additional restriction that
the distributions must be independently and identically distributed.
The motivation for modeling the auction problem as a simultaneous game is that it is a natural
way to “regularize” the worst-case equilibrium beliefs. The assumption that nature fully knows the
seller’s price, and changes the environment in reaction to it, may be too extreme of a model of the
seller’s uncertainty to be realistic. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game, nature’s worst-case
distribution is a nite combination of Dirac measures, which oers the extreme implication that
the seller believes only a few, specic value proles from an innite set are possible. The worst-
case distribution that arises in the simultaneous-move game only depends on the parameters of the
environment, rather than seller’s reserve price itself. Most of all, as will be argued later, the current
model provides a more accurate revenue guarantee that the seller can achieve by “hedging” through
randomization.
The paper closest to our work is Carrasco et al. (2018), who study the problem of a seller faced
with a single buyer from an unknown distribution subject to an arbitrary number of moment con-
straints, and solve the problem with a known mean and range as a special case. This paper can be
seen as a generalization of this model to n ≥ 2 potential buyers. While the method based on duality
is similar, the application of the method as a verication tool becomes more demanding. While their
method requires verifying the value distribution in a single dimensional case, the current setup with
multiple bidders requires us to conjecture the full-edge joint distribution with nontrivial correla-
tion among bidders’ valuation, as will later become clear. Furthermore, our analysis, by varying the
number of bidders, allows us to study the impact of competition.
2See also Bergemann and Schlag (2011), Wolitzky (2016), Carroll (2015, 2017, 2019), Libgober and Mu (2019), and Chen
and Li (2018) for work on robust mechanism design in other environments or with alternative specications.
3I analyzed the Stackelberg version unaware of their contribution. Since my version focuses on the part of the results
comparable to the simultaneous game model studied in the current paper, I collect my analysis of the Stackelberg model
in the Supplemental Appendix.
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2 Model
Consider a seller selling a single good to one of n bidders in a second-price auction. The valuations
of the bidders are distributed according to a distribution F , which is unknown to the seller. Instead,
the seller knows that the support of F is contained in V := [0, 1]n and the mean for each of the
marginal distributions is equal to some m ∈ (0, 1).
The seller chooses a distribution of reserve price with support contained in [0, 1] (possibly de-
generate, i.e. a pure strategy). We model the seller’s belief under uncertainty as a distribution (over
realizations of v ∈ V ) an adversarial nature chooses to minimize the seller’s expected revenue, with
the restriction that it must satisfy the moment constraints on the marginals.
Nature and the seller play a zero-sum, simultaneous move game. The seller chooses his strategy
G over reserve price given the distribution of valuations F chosen by nature. Nature chooses the
distribution F to minimize the seller’s expected revenue, given the seller’s strategyG. The expected
revenue from the second price auction, given strategies G and F , is as follows:
Ψ(F,G) =
∫ 1
0
∫
V
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dFdG,
where v(i) is the ith highest component of v ∈ V .
We dene the feasible set of F to be P(V,m), which is the set of probability distributions on
V with marginal means equal to m. The set of feasible G is P ([0, 1]), which are the probability
distributions on the unit interval (with no dependence on m). We dene an equilibrium to be a
F ∗ ∈ P(V,m) and G∗ ∈ P ([0, 1]) such that:
Ψ(F ∗, G) ≤ Ψ(F ∗, G∗) ≤ Ψ(F,G∗), (1)
for all F ∈ P(V,m) and G ∈ P ([0, 1]). Note that solving for a Nash equilibrium of this game is
equivalent to nding a saddle point of Ψ. A well-known property of saddle points is that if there
exists F ∗ and G∗ that satisfy (1), then:4
Ψ(F ∗, G∗) = sup
G
inf
F
Ψ(F,G) = inf
F
sup
G
Ψ(F,G).
This representation allows one to interpret the game as an extension of the Stackelberg case, where
the seller commits to a (possibly) mixed strategy in reserve price, to which nature best responds. In
this sense, the resulting value Ψ(F ∗, G∗) can be seen as the revenue guarantee the seller can attain
when he is allowed to randomize.
This characterization also yields another interpretation of our robustness exercise, in terms of
the nature of the uncertainty facing the seller. Suppose the seller is not only uncertain about the
4By the max-min inequality, supG infF Ψ(F,G) ≤ infF supG Ψ(F,G). From the saddle point condition, we can
obtain the reverse inequality:
inf
F
sup
G
Ψ(F,G) ≤ sup
G
Ψ(F ∗, G) ≤ Ψ(F ∗, G∗) ≤ inf
F
Ψ(F,G∗) ≤ sup
G
inf
F
Ψ(F,G).
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain the desired equality: Ψ(F ∗, G∗) = supG infF Ψ(F,G) =
infF supG Ψ(G,F ).
3
bidders’ valuations, but also about the information they have about their valuations. All that matters
for bidders’ dominant strategy behavior are their value estimates, or the posterior means of their val-
uations. Since the values are drawn with meanm, each of their posterior means must average to the
same mean due to the law of iterative expectations. Therefore, we can relax the assumption of com-
plete information on the part of the bidders and we can interpret nature’s strategy F ∈ P(V,m) as a
distribution of their posterior means, generated by a signal unknown to the seller. Interpreted in this
light, one can see Ψ(F ∗, G∗) as a revenue guarantee that is not only robust against the distribution
of bidders’ values, but also to the information possessed by them.
Toward nding the revenue guarantee, our strategy will be to present a conjectured strategy
prole and verify that it satises the saddle-point inequalities. Before presenting the main result of
this paper, which provides the solution with n ≥ 2 bidders, it is helpful to rst illustrate the solution
in a simpler setting.
3 Robust Pricing to a Single Buyer (n = 1)
For comparison with our result, we begin with the case of a single buyer, analyzed by Carrasco et
al. (2018). The problem here reduces to a robust monopoly pricing problem. In their Proposition 5,
the authors study a setting where the seller sells a single good to a single buyer. The seller picks
a strategy G over prices under uncertainty of the demand distribution of the buyer F . The seller
knows that the support is contained in [0, 1] and the mean of this distribution is m ∈ (0, 1) . Given
G, an adversarial nature chooses F to minimize the seller’s expected revenue:
Ψ1(F,G) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
v · 1{v>p}dFdG.
The authors nd the following equilibrium, which is a saddle point of the above functional:
Proposition 1. (Carrasco et al., 2018) The following strategy prole (G∗, F ∗) is an equilibrium for the
robust monopoly selling problem:
F ∗(v) =

0 if v < α
v−α
v if v ∈ [α, 1)
1 if v = 1
G∗(p) =

∫ p
α
1
r(1−ln(α))dr if p ∈ [α, 1]
0 otherwise,
where α solves α(1− ln(α)) = m.
The authors show that both nature and the seller randomize over an interval [α, 1]: nature
choosesF that keeps the seller indierent over the support, and the seller randomizes so that nature’s
(expected) payo is linear in the buyer’s valuation. The linearity means that no other distribution F
with the same mean can reduce the seller’s revenue.
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As will be seen, some features of this equilibrium are carried over to the case of more than one
buyer. However, the multiple bidder case opens up new problems. Nature’s problem becomes richer;
with the full-edged joint distribution of bidder valuations needing to be chosen optimally. Further,
as will be seen, the support of the seller’s reserve price will not coincide with the support of the
valuations.
4 Illustration with Two Bidders
We illustrate our results with the case of two bidders. First, observe that as in the single buyer case,
there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the marginal mean
is m = 1/2.5 Suppose, to the contrary, there were a pure strategy equilibrium in which the seller
chooses a (deterministic) reserve price p. Clearly p < m, or else nature will put all mass on the value
prole (m,m), resulting in no sale. Given p < m, nature will put positive mass at (p, p), in which
case no sale occurs and the seller receives zero revenue (assuming ties are broken in favor of nature).
However, if the seller lowers his reserve price to some p′ < p, the reserve price is no longer binding
at (p, p) and a sale occurs with revenue equal to p. The deviation is strictly protable, so there is no
pure strategy equilibrium.
We begin with our conjecture for nature’s strategy. A reasonable conjecture is a strategy that
minimizes the seller’s revenue when a sale occurs, since the absence of a pure strategy equilibrium
suggests that nature cannot always prevent a sale from occurring. This means that nature sets the
value of the second highest bidder to be as low as possible, perhaps to some lower bound α (which
is yet to be determined). As for the valuation of the highest bidder, we conjecture that nature will
pick this value by randomizing with some probability distribution H(v) over [α, 1].
Figure 1: φ(v;G∗) and the support of F ∗ in the two bidder equilibrium (m = 1/2).
Notes: On the left are the expected revenue function φ(v;G∗) (in red) induced by the seller’s equilibrium strategy G∗, the supporting
ane function L(v) (in blue), and the intersection of the two (in bold red). On the right, the support of F ∗ (in bold red) and the mean
point. When m = 1
2
, α ≈ 0.317.
5We prove this to be generally the case for any n≥ 2 bidders and for anym ∈ (0, 1) in Corollary 4 of the Supplemental
Appendix.
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Of course, this is simply a conjecture at this point, and one will need to verify that it forms an
equilibrium. Later, we will prove this is indeed an equilibrium strategy in a general setting. Summing
up, this conjectured strategy F ∗ randomly picks one bidder to be the highest bidder, producing value
proles of the form (v, α) or (α, v), where α is some xed value in (0, 1) and v is drawn from some
H(v) over [α, 1]. Visually, the support of F has an “L”-shape, as can be seen in the right panel of
Figure 1. Formally,
supp(F ∗) = S1 ∪ S2,
where S1 := {(v, α) : v ∈ [α, 1]} and S2 := {(α, v) : v ∈ [α, 1]}. Each segment Si contains the
realized value proles when the ith bidder is chosen to be the highest (and the other the second
highest).
In order to pin down H(v), we consider strategies which make the seller indierent across all
(possible) reserve prices. We dene η(p;F ) to be the expected revenue facing the seller:
η(p;F ) =
∫
V
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dF
=
2 · 12p(1−H(p)) if p > αα if p ≤ α
=
p(1−H(p)) if p > αα if p ≤ α.
For the seller to be indierent across reserve prices, we require that for all p ∈ (α, 1):
p(1−H(p)) = α, or H(p) = p− α
p
.
Since limp→1H(p) = 1 − α, there must be a mass of α at 1. Intuitively, for the seller to earn α
even for p arbitrarily close to 1, nature must put a mass of α at 1. Our conjecture for H is therefore:
H(v) =

0 if v < α
v−α
v if v ∈ [α, 1)
1 if v = 1
We can pin down α using the mean constraint on F . Each bidder i is chosen to be the highest
bidder with probability 1/2 , in which case his valuation is determined by H . With the remaining
probability, he is chosen to be the second highest bidder, with valuation α. Hence, the mean of each
bidder’s marginal distribution is:
m =
1
2
α+
1
2
(
α+
∫ 1
α
vh(v)dv
)
= α+
1
2
∫ 1
α
α
v
dv = α
(
1− 1
2
ln(α)
)
,
with h(v) = α
v2
on [α, 1]. This equation pins down a unique solution for α, as we will later argue in
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the general n bidder setting. With m = 1/2, α = 0.317, as is depicted in Figure 1.
Now we will turn to the problem of nding a G∗ so that this conjectured F ∗ will be a best
response by nature. If we take a step back, we can see that for any given strategy G by the seller,
nature faces the following problem:
inf
F
∫
V
φ(v;G)dF (2)
s.t.
∫
V
vi(v)dF = m∫
V
dF = 1
F ≥ 0.
where φ(v;G) :=
∫ 1
0 max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dG.
It is useful to observe that this is a linear program in F . Given our conjecture for F ∗, we can use
the dual of this program to verify the optimality of F ∗ with respect to the expected revenue function
φ induced by the seller’s strategy G. We use a complementary slackness condition expressed in the
following lemma. Note also that this lemma applies generally to the n-bidder case, and in fact, we
will reuse this lemma to prove the optimality of our candidate F ∗ in the general case.
Lemma 1. Given the seller’s strategy G, F ∗ is an optimal solution for nature’s problem if and only if
F ∗ is feasible and there exists an ane function L : V → R such that
L(v) ≤ φ(v;G), ∀v ∈ V and
supp(F ∗) ⊆ {v : L(v) = φ(v;G)}.
Proof. I prove the “if” part. The proof of the “only if” part, which requires the dual program, is
relegated to the Appendix.
Suppose there exists an ane function L : V → R such that L(v) ≤ φ(v;G), ∀v ∈ V . For any
F ∈ P(V,m), this implies∫
V
φ(v;G)dF ∗ =
∫
V
L(v)dF ∗ =
∫
V
L(v)dF ≤
∫
V
φ(v;G)dF.
The rst equality follows because φ and L coincide on the support of F ∗. The second equality
follows because L is ane and F and F ∗ have the same mean. The nal inequality follows since
L(v) ≤ φ(v;G) for all v. Hence F ∗ is an optimal solution for nature.
This lemma states that in order for our conjecturedF ∗ to be a best response to the seller’s strategy
G, there must exist an ane function L(v) such that expected revenue function φ induced by G
coincides with L on the support of F ∗, and is everywhere above L. The key implication of this
lemma is that if we can nd a strategy G∗ and an ane function L such that the conditions of the
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lemma are satised, then (F ∗, G∗) is an equilibrium.
This duality lemma borrows from the approach used in Scarf (1957) in the context of inventory
management, in which he constructs a supporting quadratic polynomial to solve for the worst-case
demand distribution under a mean and variance constraint. This technique has also been used in
the context of monopoly pricing in Carrasco et al. (2018), in an optimal transport program for an
auction setting in He and Li (2019), and in Bayesian persuasion in Dworczak and Martini (2019). One
dierence relative to Scarf and several other recent work is that the primal objective function φ is
itself endogenous. Unlike nding the dual for a xed φ, we are simultaneously choosing G and L to
satisfy complementary slackness.
For any given G, it is without loss to rst examine φ(v;G) on S1, the subset of the “L”-shape
support in which nature picks the bidder 1 to be the highest bidder. On S1, the expected revenue
function will be:
φ(v;G) =
∫ 1
0
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dG
=
∫ v2
0
v2dG(p) +
∫ v1
v2
pg(p)dp,
assuming that G admits density g(p), which will be the case as we show below. For the conjectured
F ∗ to be optimal, Lemma 1 requires that φ(v;G) must be equal to some ane function L(v) =
c1v1 + c2v2 + b on this segment. This implies that for all (v, α) ∈ S1:
∂φ
∂v1
(v, α) = vg(v) = c1, or g(v) =
c1
v
.
This logic applies symmetrically if nature had picked bidder 2 to be the highest bidder instead,
so we can consider c1 = c2 = c. This pins down the form of the sender’s strategy for p ∈ [α, 1].
In order to satisfy the remaining conditions of the Lemma, we now can nd c so that φ ≥ L for all
value proles.
A necessary condition for φ ≥ L is that on each of the segments Si of supp(F ∗), the partial
derivative of φ with respect to the second highest bidder must be greater than or equal to c. Taking
a point (v, α) ∈ S1 we nd:
∂φ
∂v2
(v, α) = G(α) ≥ c.
We can set c = G(α), which is the mass the sender assigns for reserve prices below α. Using the
fact that G must integrate to 1, we nd:
1 =
∫ 1
0
dG(p) = G(α) +
∫ 1
α
G(α)
p
dp = G(α)(1− ln(α)),
so we have:
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c = G(α) =
1
1− ln(α) .
We prove the optimality of the strategy where the seller places the entire mass G(α) at p = 0,
but there could be other payo-equivalent equilibria in which the seller may put density on [0, α].
Note that unlike the equilibrium for single buyer case in Proposition 1, the support of the seller and
nature do not fully coincide. In other words, with positive probability, the seller chooses a reserve
price that guarantees sale. As we will see later, this probability increases as the number of bidders
increases. The intuition is that as competition increases, the seller can rely less on a “binding” reserve
price to guarantee revenue as nature becomes more limited in suppressing revenue.
Finally, using the condition that φ = L at (α, α), we determine the strategy G∗ and the ane
function L:
G∗(p) =

∫ p
α
1
r(1−ln(α))dr +
1
1−ln(α) if p > α
1
1−ln(α) if p ≤ α
L(v) =
1
1− ln(α)(v1 + v2)−
α
1− ln(α)
As it turns out, φ(p;G∗) ≥ L(v) for all v ∈ V and φ = L on the support of F ∗, satisfying the
conditions of Lemma 1. The left panel of Figure 1 visualizes how φ and L satisfy this requirement
for the case of m = 1/2. Lemma 1 guarantees that F ∗ will be a best response to G∗ and due to
the construction of F ∗, which makes the sender indierent across all reserve prices, G∗ is a best
response to F ∗. Thus, we have found an equilibrium for the two-bidder game.
Two dierences emerge with the introduction of the second bidder (compared to the monopoly
pricing equilibrium). First, as mentioned earlier, the seller puts mass strictly below the support of
the marginal distribution of F . Second, the marginal distribution of F has two mass points, one at
the upper bound v = 1 (as in the single buyer equilibrium), and one at the lower bound α (unlike
the single buyer equilibrium).
5 Main Result
In this section, I present a prole of candidate strategies (F ∗, G∗) that form an equilibrium in the
n-bidder case, which is a natural extension of the two bidder equilibrium. In Section 6, I will prove
that these strategies satisfy the saddle point requirement. The candidate strategy prole is as follows:
F ∗(U) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
1Si ·H(Pi(U)), (3)
G∗(p) =

∫ p
α
1
r(n−1−ln(α))dr +
n−1
n−1−ln(α) if p > α
n−1
n−1−ln(α) if p ≤ α.
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in which U is any measurable set, Pi : V → R is the projection map on the ith bidder’s valuation,
1Si is the indicator function of the set Si, and (overloading notation) H is the measure dened by
the CDF of the highest bidder value distribution, which is as follows:
H(v) =

0 if v < α
v−α
v if v ∈ [α, 1)
1 if v = 1
(4)
Si = {v : vi ∈ [α, 1], v−i = α}
m = α
(
1− 1
n
ln(α)
)
.
As in the two-bidder equilibrium, nature’s strategy rst randomly chooses a bidder with equal
probability 1/n to be the highest bidder. The valuations of the remaining bidders are all set to someα
satisfying the condition in (4). Hence, the second highest bidder always has value α. The valuation
of the highest bidder is chosen according to H(v) in (4) over [α, 1], which is the same as in the
two-bidder case.
The conditionm = α
(
1− 1n ln(α)
)
in (4) ensures that F ∗ satises the mean constraints. Similar
to the two bidder example, each bidder i is chosen as the highest bidder with probability 1/n, and
receives value distributed according to H , with remaining probability n−1n , the bidder’s valuation is
set to the lower bound α. Hence, the mean constraint on the marginal distribution of F ∗ implies the
following equation:
m =
n− 1
n
α+
1
n
(
α+
∫ 1
α
vh(v)dv
)
= α+
1
n
∫ 1
α
α
v
dv = α
(
1− 1
n
ln(α)
)
, (5)
where h is the density of H on [α, 1). When α = 0, the RHS equals 0 and when α = 1, the RHS is 1.
Since it is continuous and strictly increasing, there exists a unique α ∈ (0, 1) such that this equation
holds. Furthermore, α < m since ln(α) < 0. Explicitly, the α that solves this equation is:
α = exp
(
n+W−1
(
−nm
en
))
where W−1 is the lower branch of the Lambert W function.
This is the generalization of the “L-shape” support in the two bidder example. We dene Si :=
{v : vi ∈ [α, 1], v−i = α} to be the support of F ∗ conditional on the ith bidder being chosen as the
highest bidder. Visually, this is a line segment along the ith coordinate vector, beginning at the point
α := (α, α, ..., α), in which only the valuation of the ith bidder is allowed to vary (between α and
1). The support of F ∗ is the union of all segments Si.
The seller’s strategy is to randomize his reserve price over the interval [α, 1] with density g(r) =
1
r(n−1−ln(α)) . The seller does not choose a reserve price below α, except for the reserve price p = 0,
which he chooses with probability n−1n−1−ln(α) . We shall verify that these strategies satisfy the saddle
point condition.
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Theorem 1. The strategy prole (F ∗, G∗) satises the saddle point condition in (1) and therefore are
an equilibrium of the zero sum game. The equilibrium revenue is Ψ(F ∗, G∗) = α.
To prove this theorem, I will rst show in Section 6.1 that the seller’s strategyG∗ is optimal given
F ∗. In Section 6.2, I will prove that nature’s strategy F ∗ is optimal given G∗.
Before proceeding to the proofs, we explore several implications. First, let G∗n and F ∗n (and Hn)
be the equilibrium strategy in (3) when there are n bidders.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium revenue Ψ(F ∗n , G∗n) increases in n and converges to m as n → ∞.
Furthermore, there exists a sequence of equilibria (G∗n, F ∗n) such that the random reserve price associated
with G∗n converges to zero in probability as n→∞.
Proof. First, observe that α(n), which satises equation (5) when there are n bidders, is increasing
in n. The RHS of (5) is decreasing in n, for any α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, as n increases, the RHS shift
down. Since RHS is a increasing function of α, the α satisfying (5) must increase as n increases.
Furthermore, as n goes to innity the RHS converges to α, which implies that α converges to m.
The second part of the statement results from observing that the reserve price associated with
G∗ dened in (3) converges in probability to zero as n → ∞, as the probability assigned to reserve
prices above zero vanishes in the limit:
G∗ ((0, 1]) = G∗ ([α(n), 1]) =
− ln(α(n))
n− 1− ln(α(n)) → 0.
Corollary 2. For n′ > n, the equilibrium distribution of the highest bidder’s value Hn′ rst-order
stochastically dominates Hn.
Proof. The dierence Hn(v)−Hn′(v) for all v ∈ V is as follows:
Hn(v)−Hn′(v) =

0 if v < α(n)
v−α(n)
v if v ∈ [α(n), α(n′))
α(n′)−α(n)
v if v ∈ [α(n′), 1)
0 if v = 1
As shown in the proof of Corollary 1, α(n) is increasing in n. Hence, for all v ∈ [0, 1], Hn(v) ≥
Hn′(v).
Corollary 1 says that as the number of bidders grows large, the equilibrium revenue converges to
the mean of a single bidder’s valuation, which implies that the seller extracts a single bidder’s surplus
in the limit. Additionally, it states that there exists a sequence of equilibria such that the seller’s
reserve price converges to zero in probability, as the number of bidders goes to innity (Figure 2
shows the eect of increased competition from n = 2 to n = 10).6 The asymptotic behavior of the
6By contrast, the optimal reserve price in the Stackelberg case converges deterministically to 0 as n→∞, as seen in
Kocyigit et al. (2019) and in the Supplemental Appendix.
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equilibrium reserve price strategy is consistent with the widespread observation that reserve prices
tend to be lower than is prescribed by the standard (Bayesian) theory under the estimated distribution
of value proles, as noted by Haile and Tamer (2003) in timber auctions, Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)
in eBay auctions, and McAfee et al. (2002) in real estate auctions.
Figure 2: Strategies for nature and the seller when n = 2 and n = 10.
0 α m 1
n−1
n
1
Bidder i’s valuation
0 αm 1
n−1
n
1
Bidder i’s valuation
0 α m 1
G(α)
1
Reserve Price
0 αm 1
G(α)
1
Reserve Price
Notes: In red is the CDF of the marginal distribution of nature’s equilibrium strategy F ∗. In blue isG∗, or the CDF of the seller’s strategy
over reserve price. The marginal mean constraint ism = 1/2. The left panels correspond with the case where n = 2 and the right panels
correspond with the case where n = 10. When n = 2, α ≈ 0.317 and when n = 10, α ≈ 0.464. Observe that as the number of bidders
increases, the seller’s mass on p = 0 increases towards 1, and α increases towards the mean m.
As in the single-buyer equilibrium in Proposition 1, a key feature of this equilibrium is that the
seller randomizes in reserve price. Since nature can only pick one worst-case distribution, random-
ization allows the seller to hedge against nature. Randomization protects the seller against states of
the world that are adverse for a particular reserve price, and it forces nature to minimize revenue
across multiple realizations. In fact, under nature’s worst case distribution in this equilibrium, the
seller is indierent between all reserve prices. As the number of bidders increases however, the role
of reserve price disappears, as the probability of binding reserve prices vanishes. In this sense, the
competition “substitutes” for a reserve price. Competition appears to constrain the seller’s worst case
belief, as the value of the second highest bidder increases with n, and by Corollary 2, the distribution
of the highest bidder’s value stochastically increases in n in the rst-order sense.
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6 Proof
We will now proceed to prove Theorem 1 by proving both of the saddle point inequalities in (1) for
the strategy prole described above.
6.1 Seller’s problem
First, we show that for the F ∗ described above, G∗ is a best response by the seller. In other words,
we will show the following inequality holds for all G ∈ P ([0, 1]):
Ψ(F ∗, G) ≤ Ψ(F ∗, G∗).
Proof. Recall that F ∗ has the following form:
F ∗(U) =
n∑
i=1
1
n
1Si ·H(Pi(U)),
for any measurable set U , and
H(v) =

0 if v < α
v−α
v if v ∈ [α, 1)
1 if v = 1.
Using the same notation as in the two bidder case, we let η(p;F ) denote the seller’s expected
revenue under reserve price p given nature’s strategy F.
η(p;F ) :=
∫
V
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dF
Similar to the two bidder example, we will proceed to show that our candidate F ∗ makes the
seller indierent across all reserve prices (at least in [0, 1)). Under F ∗, if the seller sets the reserve
price below α, a sale will always occur and the seller will receive the second highest value, α. If the
seller sets the reserve price above α, then he will make a sale with probability H(p) and receive the
reserve price p as revenue. Hence, the seller’s payo under F ∗ from a given reserve price is:
η(p;F ∗) =

∑n
i=1
1
n · p(1−H(p)) if p > α
α if p ≤ α
=
p(1−H(p)) if p > αα if p ≤ α
For any reserve price p ∈ [0, 1), the revenue to the seller will be:
p(1−H(p)) = p
(
1− p− α
p
)
= α.
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When p = 1, the revenue may be smaller, depending on the tie breaking rule. Observe however
that G∗ does not put any mass at 1, so
Ψ(F ∗, G∗) = α ≥ Ψ(F ∗, G)
for any G ∈ P ([0, 1]). Hence, G∗ in Theorem 1 is a best response.
6.2 Nature’s problem
Now we will prove that for the G∗ in Theorem 1, F ∗ is a best response by nature. We will show that
for any F ∈ P(V,m),
Ψ(F ∗, G∗) ≤ Ψ(F,G∗).
Proof. Using the same notation as in the two bidder case, we let φ(v;G) denote the seller’s expected
revenue function facing nature, given the seller’s strategy G:
φ(v;G) :=
∫ 1
0
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dG.
We use Lemma 1 to verify the optimality of F ∗. Recall that Lemma 1 states that if there exists an
ane function L(v) such that L(v) ≤ φ(v;G∗) for all v ∈ V , and in addition, L(v) = φ(v;G∗) on
the support of F ∗, then F ∗ is an optimal strategy for nature. For our purpose, consider the following
ane function:
L(v) =
n∑
i=1
1
n− 1− ln(α)vi −
α
n− 1− ln(α) .
We will rst show that φ(v;G∗) = L(v) for all v ∈ supp(F ∗). First, for any v, it is without loss
to order the bidders’ valuations in v from highest to lowest v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. We can write:
φ(v;G∗) =
∫ 1
0
max{v2, p} · 1{v1>p}dG∗
= v2G
∗(v2) +
∫ v1
v2
rg∗(r)dr
= v2G
∗(v2) +
v1 − v2
n− 1− ln(α)
Recall that the candidate strategy for the seller G∗ is:7
G∗(p) =

∫ p
α g
∗(r)dr + n−1n−1−ln(α) if p > α
n−1
n−1−ln(α) if p ≤ α,
7While the current equilibrium puts mass of n−1
n−1−ln(α) on p = 0, there could be other equilibria in which the seller
may put density on [0, α]. All of these equilibria are payo equivalent but may not yield the same behavior.
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where
g∗(r) =
 1r(n−1−ln(α)) if r > α0 if r ≤ α.
Take any point v in one of the segments Si := {v : vi ∈ [α, 1], v−i = α} of the “L-shape”
support. The highest bidder’s value is some v ∈ [α, 1], and the values of the remaining bidders are
all α. It is without loss to consider (v, α, α, ..., α) ∈ S1, as the following holds symmetrically in all
Si:
φ(v, α, ..., α;G∗) = αG∗(α) +
∫ v
α
rg∗(r)dr
=
(n− 1)α
n− 1− ln(α) +
v
n− 1− ln(α) −
α
n− 1− ln(α)
L(v, α, ..., α) =
(n− 1)α
n− 1− ln(α) +
v
n− 1− ln(α)) −
α
n− 1− ln(α) .
Hence, L and φ are identical (or intersect) on the support of F ∗.
Now we will show that for all v ∈ V , φ(v;G∗) ≥ L(v). We dene the following functions in
order to simplify the analysis:
ϕ(u, q) := φ(u, q, q, ..., q;G∗),
`(u, q) := L(u, q, q, ..., q),
ϕ(u, q) and `(u, q) are respectively φ and L when the highest bidder’s value is u and the values
of the other bidders are equal to q ≤ u.
Since φ only depends on the highest and second highest bidder, the realization of φ will not be
altered if the rest of the valuations v3, ..., vn were set to the second highest bidder’s value v2. Hence,
φ(v) = ϕ(v1, v2).
Additionally, since L is increasing in each coordinate,
`(v1, v2) ≥ L(v).
These functions allow us to compare φ and L at various value proles without having to specify
v3, ..., vn.
There are three separate cases to consider in order to show φ ≥ L: (1) the second highest bidder’s
value is above the lower bound α, (2) the highest bidder’s value is above α but the second highest’s
is below α, and (3) all values are below α.
Case (1): v2 > α.
Observe rst that for any u > q,
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∂ϕ
∂r
(u, q) = G∗(q).
For any v such that v2 > α,
L(v) ≤ `(v1, v2) =
∫ v2
0
∂`
∂v2
dv2 =
∫ v2
0
n− 1
n− 1− ln(α)dv2 =
∫ v2
0
G∗(0)dv2
φ(v;G∗) = ϕ(v1, v2) =
∫ v2
0
∂ϕ
∂v2
dv2 =
∫ v2
0
G∗(v2)dv2,
whereG∗(0) = n−1n−1−ln(α) refers to the mass of the atom at p = 0. Since v2 > α,G
∗(v2) ≥ G∗(α) =
G∗(0) and therefore φ(v;G∗) = ϕ(v1, v2) ≥ `(v1, v2) ≥ L(v).
Case (2): v1 ≥ α ≥ v2.
For v2 less than α, G∗(v2) = G∗(0) = n−1n−1−ln(α) , since G
∗ does not have any mass in (0, α).
Hence,
L(v) ≤ `(v1, v2) = v1
n− 1− ln(α) +
(n− 1)v2
n− 1− ln(α) −
α
n− 1− ln(α)
φ(v;G∗) = ϕ(v1, v2) = v2G∗(0) +
(v1 − α)
n− 1− ln(α)
=
v1
n− 1− ln(α) +
(n− 1)v2
n− 1− ln(α) −
α
n− 1− ln(α) .
Therefore, φ(v;G∗) ≥ L(v).
Case (3): α > v1.
Since as mentioned above, G∗ only has mass at p = 0 within the interval [0, α], the expected
revenue is φ(v;G∗) = v2G∗(0). In other words, the expected revenue is simply the second highest
bidder’s value times the probability that a sale occurs, which is the probability that p < α, since
v1 < α. Note
L(v) ≤ `(v1, v2) = v1
n− 1− ln(α) +
(n− 1)v2
n− 1− ln(α) −
α
n− 1− ln(α)
≤ (n− 1)v2
n− 1− ln(α) , and
φ(v;G∗) = ϕ(v1, v2) = v2G∗(0) =
(n− 1)v2
n− 1− ln(α) .
Therefore, φ(v;G∗) ≥ L(v) for all v ∈ V .
By Lemma 1, we have proven that F ∗ is an best response for nature.
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7 Conclusion
We have studied the seller’s optimal reserve price in a second price auction, subject to moment con-
ditions of the distribution of bidders’ values. We have identied the worst-case distribution chosen
by nature and the optimal reserve price strategy of the seller as the equilibrium of a zero-sum, simul-
taneous move game. The dual approach allowed us to nd a precise way in which nature chooses
the joint distribution of bidders’ values, with the added complexity that the primal is endogenously
determined by the seller’s strategy. We have shown that the seller sets a binding reserve price with
vanishing probability as the number of bidder increases.
A Appendix: Proof of “Only if” of Lemma 1
To prove the converse of Lemma 1, we construct the dual of nature’s minimization problem in (2):
max
γi,η
n∑
i=1
γi ·m+ η
s.t.
n∑
i=1
γivi(v) + η ≤ φ(v;G), ∀v ∈ V.
The dual variables γi and η together belong in Rn+1. This representation follows the dual of the
semi-innite linear program in Anderson and Nash (1987).
The primal is bounded above by 1, and the measure F = δm, which assigns all mass to the mean
point m = (m,m, ...,m), is in the interior of the primal cone. By Theorem 3.12 in Anderson and
Nash (1987), strong duality holds.
The dual solution (γ∗, η∗) denes an ane function L(v) = 〈γ∗,v〉 + η∗. Given the primal
solution, we can rewrite the dual in terms of this ane function.
max
L
∫
V
L(v)dF
s.t. L(v) ≤ φ(v;G), ∀v ∈ V
The constraint of the dual guarantees that the ane function is below the expected revenue
function. There is no duality gap, which means:∫
V
L(v)dF ∗ =
∫
V
φ(v;G)dF ∗.
Therefore, points at which L(v) < φ(v;G) must only occur on a measure zero set with respect
to F ∗. By the denition of the support, we obtain:
∀v ∈ supp(F ∗), L(v) = φ(v;G).
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Supplemental Appendix (Not for Publication)
Equilibrium of the Stackelberg Game
I summarize the equilibrium of the Stackelberg equilibrium, so as to compare with the equilibrium
of the simultaneous game. These results can also be found in Propositions 12 – 13 of Kocyigit et
al. (2019), who nd nature’s best response as the limit of a sequence of strategies. As before, the
valuations of the bidders are distributed according to an unknown distribution F . Instead, the seller
knows that the support of F is contained in V := [0, 1]n and the mean for each of the marginal
distributions is equal to some m ∈ (0, 1).
For a realized value prole v and reserve price p, the revenue to the seller is:
pi(v; p) =
max{v(2), p} v(1) > p0 v(1) ≤ p,
where v(i) is the ith highest component of v. Notice that bidders play weak dominant strategies
of bidding their valuations and that when the highest value v(1) is exactly equal to p no sale occurs.
This corresponds to the bidders breaking ties in favor of nature (they do not participate).8 This also
guarantees that pi is lower semi-continuous in v.
Nature chooses the distribution F over value proles to minimize the seller’s expected revenue
subject to the moment constraints on the marginals, after the seller has already set a reserve price.
Hence, the problem facing the seller can be described as:
sup
p
min
F
∫
V
pi(v; p)dF (6)
s.t.
∫
V
vi(v)dF = m, i ∈ {1, ..., n}∫
V
dF = 1
F ≥ 0,
Notice that the minimum solution for nature is well-dened. The feasible set is a closed subset
of P(V ), the space of probability measures on V , which is compact under the weak-* topology for
measures. Lower semi-continuity of the objective function in v implies lower semi-continuity in
F under the weak-* topology (Theorem 15.1, Aliprantis and Border, 2006). Hence, the minimum is
attained.
In order to state the optimal reserve price and nature’s best response, we rst dene the following:
δv is the Dirac measure on value prole v, p := (p, ..., p), 1 := (1, ..., 1), and vi := {v : vi =
1, v−i = p} is the value prole with the ith component equal to 1 and rest equal to p. vi refers
8Since breaking ties in this way is consistent with bidders’ optimal behavior, the current assumption is justied by an
equilibrium of an extended game in which the bidders are also strategic but play dominant strategies.
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to value proles in which the ith bidder is selected to be the highest bidder with value 1, and the
remaining bidders have values equal to p, minimizing the revenue to the seller.
Theorem 2. For the Stackelberg auction problem with n bidders, there exists a nite support solution
to nature’s minimization problem:
F ∗ =

∑n
i=1
1−m
(1−p)(n−1)δvi +
(
1− n(1−m)(1−p)(n−1)
)
δ1 p ≤ 1n and p < nm−1n−1∑n
i=1
(
m−p
1−p
)
δvi +
(
1− n(m−p)1−p
)
δp p ≤ 1n and p ≥ nm−1n−1(
1−m
1−p
)
δp +
(
m−p
1−p
)
δ1 p >
1
n .
For the auction problem with n bidders, the revenue guarantee for the seller is maximized by a
reserve price
p∗ =
1−
√
1−m n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m[
0, 1n
]
n > 1+
√
1−m
m .
The revenue guarantee under this price is
V (p∗) =
n(1−
√
1−m)2 n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m
nm−1
n−1 n >
1+
√
1−m
m .
Before proving this result, we explore the following implications. First, observe that as the num-
ber of bidders increases, the optimal reserve price goes to zero, and the revenue guarantee converges
to the mean.
Corollary 3. As the number of bidders n goes to innity, limn→∞ p∗ = 0 and limn→∞ V (p∗) = m.
Furthermore, note that the characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium shows that there is no
pure strategy δp in the simultaneous game satisfying condition (1). If there were such an equilibrium,
the seller’s optimal price and nature’s best response would also be an equilibrium of the Stackelberg
game:
Ψ(F, δp) =
∫ 1
0
∫
V
max{v(2), p} · 1{v(1)>p}dδpdF =
∫
V
pi(v; p)dF.
Corollary 4. There is no pure strategy equilibrium satisfying the equilibrium condition of the simul-
taneous move game in (1).
Proof. Suppose the seller chooses a (deterministic) reserve price p. Nature’s strategy in Theorem 2
can be interpreted as nature’s best response to any deterministic reserve price set by the seller. For
each of the cases, we can nd a protable deviation for the seller.
Case (i): p ≤ 1n and p ≥ nm−1n−1 . In this case, nature places support on the value proles vi and
1. If this is the case, suppose the seller picks an new reserve price p′ > p . If nature draws vi, the
highest value is 1 and the second highest value is p, so a sale occurs and the new reserve price p′
binds. In this case, the seller receives pi(vi; p′) = p′ > p = pi(vi; p), the revenue under the original
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reserve price. If nature draws 1, the highest and second highest values are equal to 1, so the seller
receives the same revenue as before.
Case (ii): p ≤ 1n and p ≥ nm−1n−1 . In this case, nature places support on the value proles vi and
p. As mentioned earlier in Section 4, the seller can deviate by choosing a reserve price p′ < p. When
nature draws p, the second highest value will be p, which is strictly above the reserve price p′. A
sale occurs and the seller receives revenue pi(p; p′) = p > 0 = pi(p; p), under the original reserve
price (due to the tie-breaking rule). When nature draws vi, the highest bidder’s value is 1 and the
second highest bidder’s value is p, and the seller receives the same revenue as before.
Case (iii): p > 1n . In this case, nature places support on the value proles p and 1. As in Case
(ii), the seller can deviate by choosing a reserve price p′ < p. When nature draws p, the second
highest value will be p, which is strictly above the reserve price p′, and the seller receives revenue
pi(p; p′) = p > 0 = pi(p; p). The payo when nature draws the value prole 1 remains the same.
Hence, we have shown that for any pure strategy p chosen by the seller, there always exists a
protable deviation.
A.1 Nature’s Best Response
In this section, we prove that nature’s strategy F ∗ in Theorem 2 is optimal given any reserve price
p. Similarly with the proof of the optimality of nature’s strategy in the simultaneous case, we nd a
lower ane envelope L(v) of pi(v; p) that intersects it on the support of F ∗, and then by Lemma 1,
this shows F ∗ is optimal.
Proof. As a result of Lemma 1, in order to prove that F ∗ is an optimal solution, it is sucient to
construct a support hyperplane L so that L and pi are equal on the support of F ∗.
Case (i): p ≤ 1n and p ≥ nm−1n−1 . We prove the optimality of
F ∗ =
n∑
i=1
(
m− p
1− p
)
δvi +
(
1− n(m− p)
1− p
)
δp.
Note that, given p ≥ nm−1n−1 , F ∗ is a valid probability distribution. For our purposes, consider the
following ane function L:
L(v) =
p
1− p
n∑
i=1
vi − np
2
1− p.
We will proceed to show that this function is everywhere below pi. To this end, suppose rst
that v(2) ≥ p. Note that we can obtain an upper bound of the ane function by setting v(1) = 1 and
v(i) = v(2), ∀i ≥ 2:
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L(v) ≤ p
1− p + (n− 1) ·
p
1− pv
(2) − np
2
1− p
=
p+ (n− 1) · pv(2) − np2
1− p
≤
1
n +
n−1
n v
(2) − n( 1n)2
n−1
n
≤ v(2) = pi(v; p).
The third inequality is derived from the observation that the RHS is increasing in p (hence we can
bound this by evaluating the RHS at the highest possible value of p = 1n).
9 When v(2) < p < v(1),
we nd similarly:
L(v) ≤ p+ (n− 1) · p
2 − np2
1− p
≤ p = pi(v; p).
Finally, when v(1) ≤ p (no sale occurs),
L(v) ≤ np
2 − np2
1− p = 0 = pi(v; p).
For u ∈ supp(F ∗) = ⋃ni=1 vi ∪ p, we can see that L(u) = φ(u; p). Note that for the value
proles vi, one bidder has a value of 1, and the remaining have a value of p, so the revenue to the
seller is p. When the value prole is p, as mentioned earlier the maximum value of the n bidders is
p and no sale takes place. More precisely,
L(v) =
p
1− p + (n− 1) ·
p2
1− p −
np2
1− p
= p = pi(v; p)
L(p) =
np2
1− p −
np2
1− p = 0 = pi(p; p).
9The derivative of the upper bound is as follows.
d
dp
(
p+ (n− 1) · pv(2) − np2
1− p
)
=
(
1 + (n− 1) · v(2) − 2np
)
(1− p) +
(
p+ (n− 1) · pv(2) − np2
)
(1− p)2
=
(1− v(2)) + n(v(2) + p2 − 2p)
(1− p)2
The goal is to evaluate when the numerator is positive. If we take the derivative of the numerator with respect to v(2)
we obtain n − 1 > 0. Hence we can nd a lower bound for this expression by setting v(2) = p, since v(2) ≥ p. At this
point the numerator is (1− p) + np(p− 1) = (1− np)(1− p) ≥ 0, since p ≤ 1
n
. Hence, the RHS of the above is weakly
greater than zero.
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Hence, we have proven that F ∗ is an optimal solution. The expected revenue under this distri-
bution is
∫
V pi(v; p)dF
∗ = np(m−p)1−p .
Case (ii): p ≤ 1n and p < nm−1n−1 . We prove the optimality of
F ∗ =
n∑
i=1
1−m
(1− p)(n− 1)δvi +
(
1− n(1−m)
(1− p)(n− 1)
)
δ1.
This corresponds with the case wherem /∈ ∆ (⋃ni=1 vi ∪ p), and so any probability distribution
that satises the marginal mean constraints cannot contain the point p in its support. We show the
ane function
L(v) =
n∑
i=1
vi
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
bounds pi(v; p) from below. To this end, suppose rst that v(2) ≥ p. We use the same upper bound
in case (i) to show the following.
L(v) ≤ 1
n− 1 + (n− 1) ·
v(2)
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
≤ v(2) = pi(v; p).
Next, suppose that v(2) < p < v(1).
L(v) ≤ 1
n− 1 + (n− 1) ·
p
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
≤ p = pi(v; p).
Finally, suppose that v(1) ≤ p.
L(v) ≤ np
n− 1 −
1
n− 1
≤ 1
n− 1 −
1
n− 1 = 0 = pi(v; p).
Note that the second inequality required p ≤ 1n , so if p is too large this solution is no longer valid
(case (iii) applies in this case).
For any u ∈ supp(F ∗) = ⋃ni=1 vi ∪ 1, we can see that L(u) = pi(u; p). Specically,
L(v) =
1
n− 1 + (n− 1) ·
p
n− 1 −
1
n− 1 = p = pi(v; p) and
L(1) =
n
n− 1 −
1
n− 1 = 1 = pi(1; p).
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Hence, we have proven that F ∗ is an optimal solution in this case. The expected revenue under
this distribution is nm−1n−1 .
Case (iii): p > 1n . We prove the optimality of
F ∗ =
1−m
1− p δp +
m− p
1− p δ1.
In this case, nature only assigns mass to the no sale point p and the highest value prole 1. We
show the ane function
L(v) =
1
n(1− p)
n∑
i=1
vi − p
1− p
bounds pi(v; p) from below. Suppose rst that v(2) ≥ p. We can create the same upper bound for L
as we did in case (i) and (ii):
L(v) ≤ 1
n(1− p) + (n− 1) ·
v(2)
n(1− p) −
p
1− p
=
1− np+ (n− 1)v(2)
n(1− p)
≤ 1− n
1
n + (n− 1)v(2)
n(1− 1n)
= v(2) = pi(v; p).
The second inequality is derived from the observation that the RHS is decreasing in p (so we can
bound this by evaluating the RHS at the lowest possible value of p = 1n).
10 When v(2) < p < v(1):
L(v) ≤ 1
n(1− p) + (n− 1) ·
p
n(1− p) −
p
1− p
=
1− np+ np− p
n(1− p)
=
1
n
< p = pi(v; p).
Finally, when v(1) ≤ p,
10The derivative of the bound on L(v) is as follows:
d
dp
(
1− np+ (n− 1)v(2)
n(1− p)
)
=
−n2(1− p) + 1− np+ (n− 1)v(2)
n2(1− p)2
=
−n2(1− p) + n(v(2) − p) + (1− v(2))
n2(1− p)2
The numerator of this derivative is strictly decreasing inn (this derivative of the numerator with respect ton is−2n(1−
p) + (v(2) − p) < 0). Hence, we can bound the numerator by setting n = 1. When n = 1, the numerator is −(1− p) +
(v(2) − p) + (1− v(2)) = 0. Therefore, the derivative with respect to p is less than or equal to 0.
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L(v) ≤ p− p
1− p = 0 = pi(v; p).
On the support of F ∗, this inequality holds with equality:
L(p) =
np
n(1− p) −
p
1− p = 0 = pi(p; p)
L(1) =
n
n(1− p) −
p
1− p = 1 = pi(1; p).
Hence we have proven that F ∗ is an optimal solution in this case. The expected revenue under
this distribution is m−p1−p . Thus altogether, the revenue guarantee under nature’s strategy is:
V (p) =

nm−1
n−1 p ≤ 1n and p < nm−1n−1
np(m−p)
1−p p ≤ 1n and p ≥ nm−1n−1
m−p
1−p p >
1
n .
A.2 Seller’s Optimal Reserve Price
Proof. First, we consider the revenue guarantee in terms of the following cases of n.
Case (1): n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m .
Equivalently, this inequality can be expressed in terms of m as 0 < m ≤ 2n−1
n2
. We can split this
case further into two sub-cases: (i) when 0 < m ≤ 1n and (ii) when 1n < m ≤ 2n−1n2 .
Whenm ≤ 1n , nm−1n−1 ≤ 0, which implies that for all p > 0,m ∈ ∆(
⋃n
i=1 vi∪p). The worst-case
expected revenue becomes
V (p) =

np(m−p)
1−p p ≤ 1n
m−p
1−p p >
1
n .
Since m ≤ 1n , the revenue V (p) < 0 for p > 1n and V (p) ≥ 0 for p ≤ 1n . When p ≤ 1n , we have
d
dpV (p) =
np2−2np+nm
(1−p)2 , so V (p) admits an interior maximum at p
∗ = 1−√1−m, which is in the
domain since 1−√1−m ≤ m ≤ 1n .11
At the interior maximum, the revenue to the seller will be:
V (p∗) =
np∗(m− p∗)
1− p∗ = n(1−
√
1−m) · m− 1 +
√
1−m√
1−m = n(1−
√
1−m)2
When 1n ≤ m ≤ 2n−1n2 , 0 < nm−1n−1 ≤ 1n . The worst case expected revenue is:
11When m = 0, 1−√1−m = m = 0. In addition, d
dm
1−√1−m = 1
2
√
1−m < 1.
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V (p) =

nm−1
n−1 p ∈
[
0, nm−1n−1
)
np(m−p)
1−p p ∈
[
nm−1
n−1 ,
1
n
]
m−p
1−p p >
1
n .
When p = 1n ,
np(m−p)
1−p =
nm−1
n−1 , and so max[nm−1n−1 , 1n ] V (p) ≥
nm−1
n−1 . In addition, V
′(p) =
d
dp
m−p
1−p =
m−1
(1−p)2 < 0. Since
m−p
1−p is decreasing in p,
m−p
1−p <
m− 1
n
1− 1
n
= nm−1n−1 when p >
1
n .
This implies that we can restrict our search to p ∈
[
nm−1
n−1 ,
1
n
]
. The interior solution p∗ = 1 −
√
1−m is attainable since 1−√1−m is increasing and 1−√1−m ≤ 1−
√
1− 2n−1
n2
= 1− n+1n =
1
n . So for all cases when n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m , V (p) admits an the interior solution p
∗ = 1−√1−m.
Case (2): n > 1+
√
1−m
m .
In this case, nm−1n−1 >
1
n . The worst-case expected revenue becomes
V (p) =
nm−1n−1 p ≤ 1nm−p
1−p p >
1
n .
As shown earlier, m−p1−p <
nm−1
n−1 when p >
1
n . Any price p ∈ [0, 1n ] is optimal.
To conclude, the optimal reserve price p∗ is:
p∗ =
1−
√
1−m n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m[
0, 1n
]
n > 1+
√
1−m
m .
The revenue guarantee at the optimal reserve price p∗ is:
V (p∗) =
n(1−
√
1−m)2 n ≤ 1+
√
1−m
m
nm−1
n−1 n >
1+
√
1−m
m .
27
